EU’s Defense of Democracy Package and Foreign Agents Law
Date: 18 October 2024
The Georgian Elections Observatory (GEO) is a short-term initiative focused on fact-checking pre-election narratives leading up to the crucial parliamentary elections on October 26. What sets this project apart from traditional fact-checking platforms is that it doesn't just address specific claims but examines entire narratives, offering political analysis alongside fact-checking and media analysis. This project is powered by the Fojo Swedish Media Institute in partnership with Investigative Media Lab (IML) and the UG Security, Politicy, & Nationalism Research Center (UGSPN).
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On October 11, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated:
“The ‘Transparency Law’ was initiated in the European Union, similar to the one we proposed in Georgia, which, including by EU representatives, was labelled the ‘Russian Law.’ The justification for this was that by halting the adoption of a similar law in the EU, they would not be able to pressure Georgia to withdraw its own version. Is this not a revelation? People openly admit the law is good but say it shouldn’t apply to Georgia, so they reject it for themselves.”
On December 12, 2023, the European Union indeed adopted the “Democracy Protection” package. A central part of this package is a proposal for a directive on the “transparency of interest of representatives’ activities carried out on behalf of third countries.”
Representatives of Georgia’s ruling party often compare this directive to the “Russian law” they proposed in Georgia. According to the Speaker of the Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, the EU directive has a “spirit and content” similar to the Georgian draft law. However, despite some similarities, the EU directive and Georgia’s law are fundamentally different.
The EU directive aims to prevent foreign interference and disinformation. It targets entities that represent the interests of third countries, such as lobbyists, and seeks to standardize transparency practices across EU member states. Its focus is on ensuring common transparency standards throughout the EU.
In contrast, Georgia's “foreign agents” law targets organizations that receive foreign funding, particularly civil society groups and media outlets. The EU directive does not single out entities based on their foreign funding status, nor does it focus specifically on NGOs or media. Furthermore, the EU directive includes safeguards to ensure proportionality and prevent discrimination or stigmatization. It also protects fundamental rights, like freedom of expression and association. This contrasts with the Georgian Dream party’s law of 2023, which aimed to discredit civil society and critical media by labelling them as “agents.”
Unlike the EU directive, the Georgian law is not part of a broader package to protect democracy or transparency. It stands alone and, according to its initiators, aims to increase transparency around foreign funding for NGOs and political opponents of the ruling party.
Finally, the claim that the EU rejected its law because of Georgia is baseless. The EU began discussing its directive in September 2022. In her State of the Union address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that a proposal on foreign financing was already under development. While initially expected in spring 2023, consultations on the directive are still ongoing.
POLITICAL ANALYSIS
From Calculated Ambivalence to Anti-Western Stance
Anti-Western narratives in Georgia originate from the imperial rule of the Soviet Union. These narratives regarding issues of national identity and traditions, as well as towards state sovereignty, were an integral part of the Soviet anti-Western discourse. After the restoration of Georgian independence, the West became not only a source of physical survival and development of statehood, but was also constitutionally recognized as a chief foreign policy priority. At the same time, anti-Western discourse has coexisted with official pro-Western policies in contemporary Georgia and has largely been rooted in cultural anxieties and ultra-nationalist narratives.
While pro-Western and pro-Russian policies and narratives acquired mutually exclusive content, especially after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the current Georgian government has attempted to determine its foreign policy course ambivalently in relation to these two spaces. This policy was aimed, on the one hand, at maintaining the level of integration with Western organizational structures and thus at mobilizing pro-European voters locally; and on the other hand, at encouraging a softened tone towards Russia and anti-Western, ultra-nationalist sentiments. Recently, Georgia’s ruling elite has been actively using anti-Western rhetoric both to divert attention from other political issues in the pre-election period, and to instrumentalize public polarization, all the while supporting (covertly or overtly) pro-Russian narratives.
Historically, the anti-Western narrative developed within the Soviet Union painted the Western world as an evil, immoral empire characterized by interference in the internal affairs of other countries and causing destabilization or conflict. In the post-Soviet space, the enduring influence of these narratives has been amplified by pro-Russian and ultra-nationalist forces, which have continuously worked to undermine the pro-Western orientation of countries like Georgia. At the same time, Russia’s strategic disinformation campaigns have played a critical role in portraying Western liberalism as incompatible with Georgia’s Orthodox Christian values and national identity.
However, this dual strategy is not unique to Georgia: it reflects a broader pattern seen in illiberal regimes, where political elites use Western integration as a bargaining chip for leveraging the local pro-Western electorate, without fully committing to the reforms associated with it. In this context, anti-Western narratives within the country have coexisted together with publicly acclaimed, albeit selective, engagement with the West and EU integration processes. At the same time, after Russia’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine, the ruling political elite in Georgia has been moving further away from the West in both its international and local political appeals. In terms of the latter, the anti-Western sentiments, discrediting of liberal democracy, and framing of Western values as conflicting with Georgian ones have defined the contemporary anti-Western discourse. This discourse, in turn, creates the necessary ground for local legislative changes adopted with anti-Western pathos to be portrayed as the defense of Georgian values, making the rejection of Western liberalism synonymous with patriotic duty.
The issue of state sovereignty and related discussions can be considered central to observing the foreign policy shift in the country. At first glance, it is paradoxical that the issue of sovereignty is discussed not in relation to Russia, which occupies twenty percent of the country’s territory, but primarily problematized in discussions about the West. Similar dynamics can be observed in the government’s frequent references to defending Georgia’s sovereignty from external interference, portraying Western demands for democratic reforms as intrusions into the country’s internal affairs. It is within this context that the so-called “Agents Law,” adopted in 2024, should be considered. The law, modeled after Russian legislation, targets NGOs and media outlets that are essentially dependent on foreign—in this case, Western—funding in their work towards overseeing governance and providing balanced media coverage.
The softening of political messages and overall policy towards Russia is a key to deconstructing the contemporary anti-Western discourse. In this case, too, paradoxical dualism defines the scene: while Georgia’s official policy remains committed to restoring territorial integrity and rejecting Russian occupation, the ruling party has been notably cautious in its criticism of Russia, especially as a central actor of the conflicts (as opposed to blaming the previous government). Moreover, in the government’s discourse, rapprochement with the single most important source of aggressive wars in the region is considered a way towards peace and stability for Georgia.
In conclusion, anti-Western discourse in Georgia is a complex and multifaceted political tool that reflects a range of strategies, from “calculated ambivalence” to upholding Soviet anti-Western discourses. The anti-Western, ultra-nationalist, and illiberal rhetoric of a government leaning towards closer relations with Russia coexists with its publicly claimed ambition of Georgia’s EU integration. As such, anti-Western sentiments are an important component of Georgian political and public life and will thus remain a potent political force, requiring open discussion and systematic debunking should the country ever consider rapprochement with the West.