Date: 21 October 2024
The Georgian Elections Observatory (GEO) is a short-term initiative focused on fact-checking pre-election narratives leading up to the crucial parliamentary elections on October 26. What sets this project apart from traditional fact-checking platforms is that it doesn't just address specific claims but examines entire narratives, offering political analysis alongside fact-checking and media analysis. This project is powered by the Fojo Swedish Media Institute in partnership with Investigative Media Lab (IML) and the UG Security, Politicy, & Nationalism Research Center (UGSPN).
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in these stories do not necessarily reflect those of the listed organizations.
Western institutions often criticize the current government of Georgia for its democratic backsliding. In response to this criticism, representatives of the ruling party have launched verbal attacks on Western institutions. On October 14, the mayor of Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, said, “What they [the European Union] are framing and doing is no different from the Soviet Union—why does Europe have a price? The fact is that there are different states with their own cultures and traditions; if we put all this under one line and are forced to conform in the same way, what does it matter whether it’s the Soviet Union or the European Union?”
Representatives of the ruling party have made similar statements on other occasions. In February 2023, prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze, speaking about a European Parliament resolution, said, “I don’t know what is wrong with the European Parliament. We were as careful as possible about the institutions of the European Union, which is why we focused on specific MEPs. In this case, the public can see that this is a systemic problem with the institution known as the European Parliament. This is a very serious problem. Frankly, even the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union would be envious of such a decision. I clearly remember the late 1980s, when the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union’s meetings were broadcast. What happened there is the same as what is happening today with the previous two resolutions of the European Parliament.”
Non-democratic forces often equate the European Union with the Soviet Union to fuel Euroscepticism and deflect criticism. Although drawing such a parallel is absurd, the governmental forces frequently use this narrative to strengthen their anti-Western sentiments.
The European Union and the Soviet Union differ fundamentally in terms of principles, values, governance style, and structure.
Voluntary Association ≠ Forced Association
The European Union is several decades old and today unites twenty-seven member states. Joining or leaving the EU is entirely voluntary and based on the will of each state. As part of the enlargement process, prospective members must align their economic and political structures with EU standards, with compatibility with democratic principles being paramount. States can also make the decision to leave the organization, as demonstrated by the UK’s exit in 2020. In contrast, the Soviet Union was formed through the forced union of fifteen states, including Georgia, which was occupied in 1921. Despite constitutional provisions, it was practically impossible for states to leave the Soviet Union. Attempts by Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to exit the Warsaw Pact and move away from Soviet control were brutally suppressed.
Democracy ≠ Totalitarianism
Democratic governance, protection of human rights, and a market economy are core values of the European Union, as established by the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership in 1993. The EU is a democratic organization where decisions are made by democratically elected representatives of its member states. By contrast, the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state dominated by the Communist Party, where decisions were made by an authoritarian leader. Under this regime, freedom of speech, human rights, and democratic values were severely restricted. Elections were largely symbolic and did not represent true popular rule.
Market Economy ≠ Planned Economy
The European Union operates on the principles of a market economy, which includes some degree of regulation but allows economic activity to be conducted within the framework of a free market, with protections for private property and competition. By contrast, the Soviet Union had complete state control over the economy, private property did not exist, and economic hardship and goods shortages were common. The European Union, on the other hand, is characterized by prosperity and welfare states.
Sovereignty ≠ Centralized Control
Member states of the European Union retain their sovereignty and have a mandate to pursue independent policies. Even under EU regulations, such as those governing trade or environmental policies, member states maintain their independence. In the Soviet Union, the fifteen republics formally retained statehood but had little autonomy, as they were ultimately governed by the central authority in Moscow.
Multiculturalism ≠ Monoculturalism
The European Union is founded on the primacy of human rights, with a special emphasis on the rights of minorities and protection from any form of discrimination. The EU safeguards and promotes the cultural identities of small nations. Moreover, the EU supports non-member states in the preservation and strengthening of their cultural heritage; this includes Georgia. By contrast, the Soviet Union not only violated minority rights but also restricted the political and cultural identities of its nations, emphasizing the promotion of Russian culture. One notable example of this is the USSR’s attempt in 1978 to replace Georgia's state language with Russian.
Anti-Western narratives in Georgia originate from the imperial rule of the Soviet Union. These narratives regarding issues of national identity and traditions, as well as towards state sovereignty, were an integral part of the Soviet anti-Western discourse. After the restoration of Georgian independence, the West became not only a source of physical survival and development of statehood, but was also constitutionally recognized as a chief foreign policy priority. At the same time, anti-Western discourse has coexisted with official pro-Western policies in contemporary Georgia and has largely been rooted in cultural anxieties and ultra-nationalist narratives.
While pro-Western and pro-Russian policies and narratives acquired mutually exclusive content, especially after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the current Georgian government has attempted to determine its foreign policy course ambivalently in relation to these two spaces. This policy was aimed, on the one hand, at maintaining the level of integration with Western organizational structures and thus at mobilizing pro-European voters locally; and on the other hand, at encouraging a softened tone towards Russia and anti-Western, ultra-nationalist sentiments. Recently, Georgia’s ruling elite has been actively using anti-Western rhetoric both to divert attention from other political issues in the pre-election period, and to instrumentalize public polarization, all the while supporting (covertly or overtly) pro-Russian narratives.
Historically, the anti-Western narrative developed within the Soviet Union painted the Western world as an evil, immoral empire characterized by interference in the internal affairs of other countries and causing destabilization or conflict. In the post-Soviet space, the enduring influence of these narratives has been amplified by pro-Russian and ultra-nationalist forces, which have continuously worked to undermine the pro-Western orientation of countries like Georgia. At the same time, Russia’s strategic disinformation campaigns have played a critical role in portraying Western liberalism as incompatible with Georgia’s Orthodox Christian values and national identity.
However, this dual strategy is not unique to Georgia: it reflects a broader pattern seen in illiberal regimes, where political elites use Western integration as a bargaining chip for leveraging the local pro-Western electorate, without fully committing to the reforms associated with it. In this context, anti-Western narratives within the country have coexisted together with publicly acclaimed, albeit selective, engagement with the West and EU integration processes. At the same time, after Russia’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine, the ruling political elite in Georgia has been moving further away from the West in both its international and local political appeals. In terms of the latter, the anti-Western sentiments, discrediting of liberal democracy, and framing of Western values as conflicting with Georgian ones have defined the contemporary anti-Western discourse. This discourse, in turn, creates the necessary ground for local legislative changes adopted with anti-Western pathos to be portrayed as the defense of Georgian values, making the rejection of Western liberalism synonymous with patriotic duty.
The issue of state sovereignty and related discussions can be considered central to observing the foreign policy shift in the country. At first glance, it is paradoxical that the issue of sovereignty is discussed not in relation to Russia, which occupies twenty percent of the country’s territory, but primarily problematized in discussions about the West. Similar dynamics can be observed in the government’s frequent references to defending Georgia’s sovereignty from external interference, portraying Western demands for democratic reforms as intrusions into the country’s internal affairs. It is within this context that the so-called “Agents Law,” adopted in 2024, should be considered. The law, modeled after Russian legislation, targets NGOs and media outlets that are essentially dependent on foreign—in this case, Western—funding in their work towards overseeing governance and providing balanced media coverage.
The softening of political messages and overall policy towards Russia is a key to deconstructing the contemporary anti-Western discourse. In this case, too, paradoxical dualism defines the scene: while Georgia’s official policy remains committed to restoring territorial integrity and rejecting Russian occupation, the ruling party has been notably cautious in its criticism of Russia, especially as a central actor of the conflicts (as opposed to blaming the previous government). Moreover, in the government’s discourse, rapprochement with the single most important source of aggressive wars in the region is considered a way towards peace and stability for Georgia.
In conclusion, anti-Western discourse in Georgia is a complex and multifaceted political tool that reflects a range of strategies, from “calculated ambivalence” to upholding Soviet anti-Western discourses. The anti-Western, ultra-nationalist, and illiberal rhetoric of a government leaning towards closer relations with Russia coexists with its publicly claimed ambition of Georgia’s EU integration. As such, anti-Western sentiments are an important component of Georgian political and public life and will thus remain a potent political force, requiring open discussion and systematic debunking should the country ever consider rapprochement with the West.