Ivanishvili versus Georgian Dream leaders: Who accuses whom of financial blackmail?
Date: 7 October 2024
The Georgian Elections Observatory (GEO) is a short-term initiative focused on fact-checking pre-election narratives leading up to the crucial parliamentary elections on October 26. What sets this project apart from traditional fact-checking platforms is that it doesn't just address specific claims but examines entire narratives, offering political analysis alongside fact-checking and media analysis. This project is powered by the Fojo Swedish Media Institute in partnership with Investigative Media Lab (IML) and the UG Security, Politicy, & Nationalism Research Center (UGSPN).
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Bidzina Ivanishvili claims that the ruling party has never accused the US or the European Union of financial blackmail. But what have Georgian Dream leaders actually said?
“The US Embassy cannot point to any instance where I, personally, or any other leader of Georgian Dream, accused the US or the European Union of financial blackmail.” This excerpt is from a statement released by Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder and honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, on October 1. Ivanishvili’s statement was a response to a Facebook post by the US Embassy in Georgia regarding the Credit Suisse case.
Earlier that day, the US Embassy posted on social media, questioning why Ivanishvili was misleading the Georgian public about the Credit Suisse case. “Bidzina Ivanishvili knows that the money related to Credit Suisse is tied up in courts in Bermuda and Singapore, not the US. So why is he telling Georgians a different story?” the embassy’s post stated.
Bidzina Ivanishvili is suing Credit Suisse in multiple jurisdictions, seeking approximately $800 million in damages. He argues that the actions of ex-banker Patrice Lescaudron resulted in significant financial harm. The Georgian billionaire claims that his family’s accounts at Credit Suisse have incurred total losses exceeding $1.2 billion.
The next phase of the dispute began following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when reports emerged that the bank had frozen an account belonging to Ivanishvili, valued at $3.54 billion.The account was frozen due to suspicions that the funds might be of Russian origin.
In his lengthy statement responding to the US Embassy’s Facebook post, Ivanishvili emphasized that when Georgian Dream leaders spoke of bank account theft and financial blackmail, they never implicated the US or the European Union. Instead, they consistently attributed the blackmail to what they called the “Global War Party.”
“We did not accuse the US or the European Union of financial blackmail, even when Credit Suisse used a European Parliament resolution as another excuse to withhold the money. In fact, we’ve repeatedly clarified that by the Global War Party, we did not mean the US or the EU,” said Bidzina Ivanishvili. “However, we did specify that the Global War Party has significant influence over politicians and bureaucrats both in the US and the European Union.”
In fact, the leaders of Georgian Dream have not only suggested that the US and the European Union were behind the “blackmail,” but have also directly accused Western partners of orchestrating Ivanishvili’s financial robbery.
Who do the leaders of Georgian Dream blame for Ivanishvili’s “robbery”?
The European Parliament
In November 2022, Irakli Kobakhidze stated on the Georgian Public Broadcaster that Bidzina Ivanishvili was under constant threat. “Sometimes it’s the EPP, sometimes they threaten him in the European Parliament.… They expect something from him, and because he refuses—because he won’t re-enter politics against his will—they are resorting to informal means of blackmail, essentially imposing informal sanctions. His money is parked in Switzerland,” Kobakhidze said, implying that Ivanishvili had been pressured by the European Parliament to open a second front against Russia.
A few days ago, Tbilisi’s mayor Kakha Kaladze spoke openly again about the “pressure to open a second front.” He stated that the “de facto sanctioned” Ivanishvili is being denied access to his own money due to political blackmail aimed at compelling him to open a second front against Russia.
“The question arises: who or what is blocking these funds, and why hasn’t he received his money back? Bidzina Ivanishvili is de facto sanctioned. They are blackmailing him with the fate of the country, pressuring him to open a second front and to join the sanctions,” said Kaladze.
The European Parliament, one of the EU’s key institutions, passes legislation together with the Council of the European Union. Its members are elected by citizens of EU member states through direct universal suffrage every five years. The statements made by Kobakhidze and other leaders against the European Parliament amount to accusations that the EU is attempting to blackmail Ivanishvili.
USA
In April 2024, journalists asked Mamuka Mdinaradze, the executive secretary of Georgian Dream and leader of the party’s parliamentary faction, whether he anticipated sanctions from Western partners. This inquiry followed the party’s decision to proceed with adopting the so-called Russian law despite widespread protests and strong international criticism. In response to a question about the country’s Western partners, Mdinaradze stated: “What more can Bidzina Ivanishvili be sanctioned for? Two billion have been frozen, they bankrupted one of Switzerland’s most successful banks because of this, and he is effectively under sanctions.”
The Prime Minister has also made similar statements on multiple occasions. During a meeting with Georgian journalists in New York, Irakli Kobakhidze remarked that this blackmail against Ivanishvili would continue with the announcement of sanctions.
“The blackmail against Mr. Bidzina Ivanishvili continues. He is already under de facto sanctions, with $2 billion frozen in Europe. Now, this blackmail is taking on a new form, as we are hearing threats of formal sanctions. These individuals will not achieve their goal,” Kobakhidze stated.[MC1]
On September 22, Voice of America (VoA) reported that the United States had developed sanctions against Ivanishvili and was considering imposing them in the near future. According to VoA, this information was confirmed by two high-ranking US government officials and two additional sources close to the administration.
Prior to this, Secretary of State Antony Blinken had addressed the issue of sanctions. On September 16, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Georgian officials: Zviad Kharazishvili (Kharaba), head of the Special Tasks Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and his deputy, Miller Lagazauri. Sanctions were also applied to Konstantine Morgoshia and Zurab Makharadze, who are associated with “Alt-Info.” Additionally, the US State Department imposed visa restrictions on over sixty Georgians and their family members deemed to be responsible for, or contributing to, the undermining of democracy in Georgia.
Blinken stated that this process was not over and that the United States would “continue to consider additional actions in response.”
European banks
Kakha Kaladze has accused European banks of robbing Bidzina Ivanishvili. The general secretary of Georgian Dream and mayor of Tbilisi removed his own assets from foreign financial institutions, stating that he no longer trusts them following their alleged “robbery” of Ivanishvili.
“Bidzina Ivanishvili has been sanctioned. The reality is clear: a person who has won various lawsuits still cannot reclaim his money. This is a political decision. Unfortunately, there is no justice in today’s world. Just look at how they have treated Ivanishvili and what has been done to him. He has been robbed, in every sense of the word. Why should I trust them? Of course, I don’t trust them,” said Kaladze.
What does People’s Power say?
Despite the leaders of Georgian Dream explicitly blaming the West in the dispute between Ivanishvili and Credit Suisse, they maintain a relatively cautious tone. However, what Kobakhidze, Kaladze, and Ivanishvili imply indirectly is explicitly stated by the People’s Power movement.
This political union formally separated from Georgian Dream in 2022, yet it has consistently made decisions and statements that align with the political agenda of Georgian Dream. For instance, the law on Foreign Influence was officially developed by People’s Power, although Georgian Dream leaders have admiited that it was actually their initiative. Additionally, leaders of People’s Power occupy prominent positions on the 2024 parliamentary list for Georgian Dream.
People’s Power has been particularly vocal in the dispute between Ivanishvili and Credit Suisse. Its leaders have not only accused the West of blackmailing Ivanishvili but also issued a special statement calling for a reassessment of Georgia’s EU membership prospects in light of the ongoing dispute.
“We support the calls from individual experts for a broad discussion on all issues related to the ongoing developments within the European Union, including its value transformation and, consequently, Georgia’s future within the EU,” reads a 2023 statement issued by People’s Power.
POLITICAL ANALYSIS
From Calculated Ambivalence to Anti-Western Stance
Anti-Western narratives in Georgia originate from the imperial rule of the Soviet Union. These narratives regarding issues of national identity and traditions, as well as towards state sovereignty, were an integral part of the Soviet anti-Western discourse. After the restoration of Georgian independence, the West became not only a source of physical survival and development of statehood, but was also constitutionally recognized as a chief foreign policy priority. At the same time, anti-Western discourse has coexisted with official pro-Western policies in contemporary Georgia and has largely been rooted in cultural anxieties and ultra-nationalist narratives.
While pro-Western and pro-Russian policies and narratives acquired mutually exclusive content, especially after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the current Georgian government has attempted to determine its foreign policy course ambivalently in relation to these two spaces. This policy was aimed, on the one hand, at maintaining the level of integration with Western organizational structures and thus at mobilizing pro-European voters locally; and on the other hand, at encouraging a softened tone towards Russia and anti-Western, ultra-nationalist sentiments. Recently, Georgia’s ruling elite has been actively using anti-Western rhetoric both to divert attention from other political issues in the pre-election period, and to instrumentalize public polarization, all the while supporting (covertly or overtly) pro-Russian narratives.
Historically, the anti-Western narrative developed within the Soviet Union painted the Western world as an evil, immoral empire characterized by interference in the internal affairs of other countries and causing destabilization or conflict. In the post-Soviet space, the enduring influence of these narratives has been amplified by pro-Russian and ultra-nationalist forces, which have continuously worked to undermine the pro-Western orientation of countries like Georgia. At the same time, Russia’s strategic disinformation campaigns have played a critical role in portraying Western liberalism as incompatible with Georgia’s Orthodox Christian values and national identity.
However, this dual strategy is not unique to Georgia: it reflects a broader pattern seen in illiberal regimes, where political elites use Western integration as a bargaining chip for leveraging the local pro-Western electorate, without fully committing to the reforms associated with it. In this context, anti-Western narratives within the country have coexisted together with publicly acclaimed, albeit selective, engagement with the West and EU integration processes. At the same time, after Russia’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine, the ruling political elite in Georgia has been moving further away from the West in both its international and local political appeals. In terms of the latter, the anti-Western sentiments, discrediting of liberal democracy, and framing of Western values as conflicting with Georgian ones have defined the contemporary anti-Western discourse. This discourse, in turn, creates the necessary ground for local legislative changes adopted with anti-Western pathos to be portrayed as the defense of Georgian values, making the rejection of Western liberalism synonymous with patriotic duty.
The issue of state sovereignty and related discussions can be considered central to observing the foreign policy shift in the country. At first glance, it is paradoxical that the issue of sovereignty is discussed not in relation to Russia, which occupies twenty percent of the country’s territory, but primarily problematized in discussions about the West. Similar dynamics can be observed in the government’s frequent references to defending Georgia’s sovereignty from external interference, portraying Western demands for democratic reforms as intrusions into the country’s internal affairs. It is within this context that the so-called “Agents Law,” adopted in 2024, should be considered. The law, modeled after Russian legislation, targets NGOs and media outlets that are essentially dependent on foreign—in this case, Western—funding in their work towards overseeing governance and providing balanced media coverage.
The softening of political messages and overall policy towards Russia is a key to deconstructing the contemporary anti-Western discourse. In this case, too, paradoxical dualism defines the scene: while Georgia’s official policy remains committed to restoring territorial integrity and rejecting Russian occupation, the ruling party has been notably cautious in its criticism of Russia, especially as a central actor of the conflicts (as opposed to blaming the previous government). Moreover, in the government’s discourse, rapprochement with the single most important source of aggressive wars in the region is considered a way towards peace and stability for Georgia.
In conclusion, anti-Western discourse in Georgia is a complex and multifaceted political tool that reflects a range of strategies, from “calculated ambivalence” to upholding Soviet anti-Western discourses. The anti-Western, ultra-nationalist, and illiberal rhetoric of a government leaning towards closer relations with Russia coexists with its publicly claimed ambition of Georgia’s EU integration. As such, anti-Western sentiments are an important component of Georgian political and public life and will thus remain a potent political force, requiring open discussion and systematic debunking should the country ever consider rapprochement with the West.